

works appear. Published in pamphlet form, with large pages which admit good-sized diagrams, and in clear type, the book presents an attractive appearance.

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The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism. By MORTON PRINCE, M.D. J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1885.

We shudder to think of the task Dr. Prince has set himself in the little book before us; and we stand in awe of his courage when we read that this task was first attempted in a graduation thesis, "some eight or nine years ago." Graduation theses, the world over, are not remarkably long-lived, and but few of them are considered worthy of a revival after a lapse of years. Dr. Prince has done well, however, in rescuing his essay from utter oblivion. His subject is no less a one than the relations of mind and matter—that mystery of mysteries which has baffled the ingenuity of the ablest minds of all ages. It would be no mean praise to say that the author has not overreached his own ambition; but we must say more than that, for he has made an interesting contribution to the study of this question, and if he has not explained away the mystery altogether, he has, at least, defined most accurately the exact nature of the problem to be solved.

According to Dr. Prince, philosophers and psychologists have themselves to blame for the obscurity in which this question is still involved. They have deepened the mystery "by a dust of their own raising." The chief difficulty lies not, so the author would have us believe, in the problem itself, but in the cloudy notions some of our modern gods—Spencer, Tyndall, Huxley, Bain, and John Fiske—had of *what* was to be solved. Dr. Prince berates them all for their misconception of the subject under discussion, but the author will himself acknowledge that, in this instance, to state the problem clearly is to give half the proof.

To this half Dr. Prince has made a most valuable contribution. What *is* and what is *not* to be discussed, was perhaps never brought home to our minds as vividly as after reading this essay. But how about the other half of the mystery?

The theorem which Dr. Prince starts out to prove is: "Instead of there being one substance with *two properties* or 'aspects,' *there is one substance*—mind; and the other *apparent* property, motion, is only the way in which this real substance, mind, is apprehended by a *second organism*" (p. 29). It is all mind, therefore, and nothing more. If so, the author would be justified in saying, as he does further on (p. 37), that "a great deal of thought has been devoted to trying to understand how molecular changes are transformed into consciousness, when in reality there is no transformation at all." And yet, though we call in the agency of a second organism, we have still to cope with two sets of facts. Call them mind and motion, different properties of mind or different properties of matter,—call them what you will, the exact relation of these two different facts remains the chief mystery. But let us see how Dr. Prince solves the problem.

He concedes very justly that we have *mental* and *physical* phenomena to deal with. "The one we know as thought, sensation, and emotion, the other utterly unknown objectively, but represented by symbols in consciousness." The question then remains, How is consciousness formed? Dr. Prince states four possible hypotheses, but declares in favor of the following: "Consciousness may be a change in the mutual relations of the *actual* or *real* molecules of the protoplasm of the brain-cells; that is, *these unknown physical disturbances themselves,—the protoplasmic disturbances as they really are; the actuality of so-called neural undulations*" (p. 50). And again, it is stated on page 55: "*The former (the mental state) is the actuality, the latter (physical changes) a mode by which it is presented to the consciousness of a second person,¹ i. e., to the non-possessor of it.*"

But now comes the rub. How is it that one state of consciousness is perceived as another state of consciousness (in a second person)? On this point the author argues very acutely, and fortifies his position by the use of concrete examples. These are most happily chosen, and it would be doing the writer an injustice to quote them here apart from their context. If the reader does not feel firmly convinced of the force of Dr. Prince's argument, the fault may be in his "neural vibrations," and not in the author. It does not appear to us, however, to simplify matters much to state that the parallelism (as in the case of a sensation of pain and the accompanying physical phenomena) is "*between your consciousness and my (the second person's) consciousness of your consciousness.*" With a short chapter on the Correlation of Forces the first part of the book closes.

The inquiry into Human Automatism will be found both instructive and interesting. Dr. Prince thinks man an automaton, but not an automatic machine. And he shows that the reflex actions of man are largely subject to the influence of consciousness. Like all writers on automatism, our author sees the necessity of discussing the bearings of his theory upon free-will. In the section on Self-Determination he argues that freedom of the will is compatible with his theory of the reflex character of our ideas. There is a final chapter on Materialism, in which the author is at some trouble to defend and define the moral aspects of that doctrine.

The entire book, and more particularly the first half, deserves careful study. If all of the author's views cannot be definitely accepted, they have, at all events, the preëminent merit of being original, and of inducing the reader to re-analyze his own views with the aid of the additional facts and arguments which Dr. Prince has furnished. The author's language is always clear, and often unusually vigorous. We hope that Dr. Prince will ultimately turn his attention to the study of mind in disease, to those questions in particular which are on the borderland between

¹ All italics, as in original.

psychiatry and psychology. Few medical authors would seem to be better qualified for this sort of inquiry.

B. S.

Report of the Committee to Investigate the Affairs and Management of the State Lunatic Asylum at Utica.
Made to the Assembly, April 27, 1884.

In a review of testimony taken by a committee of the State Senate appointed to investigate alleged abuses in insane asylums, published in the *JOURNAL* for April, 1884, reference was made to an investigation, then in progress, of the State Lunatic Asylum at Utica, "and particularly to the circumstances concerning the death of E. D. Hughes, a patient." This investigation was made by a committee of the Assembly in April last, and its report, with the testimony, making a volume of 1,400 pages, is now published.

The case of Hughes is one common in insane asylums everywhere, but so flagrant an abuse, followed by so shameful a miscarriage of justice, could happen in no other civilized country. And the disgrace which attaches to the lunacy system of the State, and to the State itself, is made worse by the fact that the killing of Hughes is only one of a series of similar outrages which have marked the recent history of the Utica Asylum. Its similarity to the case of Tarbell, who was fatally injured by his attendants in 1859, has already been noticed.¹ Another case, brought to light by this committee, and described in its report, is that of a patient named Heath, "who died within a few days after his ribs were broken by Reese," an attendant. In another, which is referred to in the report of the asylum for 1869, the patient died, on the ninth day after admission, as the result of nine fractures of the ribs and puncture of the pleural cavity. These injuries, it should be said, were claimed by Dr. Gray to have been inflicted before admission to the asylum, as were those of Tarbell, but the presumption is clearly against such an origin, and the fact that no inquest was permitted is significant.

The history of the Hughes case is quite sufficient, however, to prove the urgent necessity of reform in the Utica Asylum. It was found by a coroner's jury that this patient came to his death from injuries inflicted by his attendants, one of whom was afterward tried and convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, against the testimony of Dr. Gray and his assistants. The Assembly committee, in the present report, declare that they have unanimously reached a conclusion to the same effect. But the guilty attendant was permitted by the judge to escape with a fine of \$1,000, which was promptly paid for him, and the officers and employés of the asylum have a new assurance of impunity for any neglect or abuse of which they may be guilty in the future.

Upon the question of the care of patients by attendants generally at this asylum, the committee are "convinced that very many

¹ *Vide* vol. ix., page 286.